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1 
RECONSIDERING THE HISTORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS 
OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE 
PRESENT. By Keith E. Whittington.* University Press of 
Kansas. 2019. Pp. xxi + 410. $39.95 (Cloth). 
Keith E. Whittington 
Somewhat surprisingly, there are still things to learn about 
the history of judicial review. The practice might have started in 
some obscurity, but for more than a century it has been at the 
center of controversy. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the young constitutional historian, Edward Corwin, coined the 
term “judicial review” to refer to the increasingly prominent 
power of American courts to interpret and enforce constitutional 
requirements against overreaching legislatures.1 Corwin was 
himself an important contributor to an active political and 
scholarly debate at the turn of the century over the origins and 
legitimacy of the practice. In a time when politicians were prone 
to warn judges that “the Supreme Court had usurped the power 
to pass on the constitutionality of acts of Congress” and would 
continue to exercise it only at the indulgence of Congress,2 Corwin 
was among those who argued that judicial review was “the natural 
outgrowth of ideas that were common property in the period 
when the Constitution was established” and consequently as 
American as apple pie.3 That early scholarship told us quite a bit 
about how American courts began to exercise the power to declare  
 
 *  William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.  
 1. Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. 
L. REV. 643, 660 (1909). 
 2. Franklyn Waltman, Jr., Curtail Power of High Court, Lewis Advises, WASH. 
POST, July 12, 1935, at 1. 
 3. Edward S. Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, 12 
MICH. L. REV. 538, 538 (1914). 
35.1 WHITTINGTON  6/19/2020  11:48 AM 
2 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 35:1 
 
statutes null and void and about the ideas and politics that gave 
rise to that. 
Late in his career, Corwin was also instrumental in solidifying 
our canonical list of cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has 
struck down a provision of an Act of Congress as unconstitutional. 
The Court itself does not keep track of such cases, and there was 
a surprising amount of disagreement about how often the Court 
had done so over the course of its history. With the Court playing 
an obviously important role in announcing and enforcing limits on 
legislative power, Congress decided that it needed a clearer 
picture of the constitutional rules of the road. Corwin was well 
suited to the task since he had already produced a popular text 
designed to explain “the real constitution of the United States,” 
the constitution as it “has come to be” through over a century of 
judicial interpretation, rather than the brief document that 
emerged from the Philadelphia Convention.4 After World War II, 
Corwin was asked to provide Congress with an overview of the 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, including a list of cases 
in which the Court had struck down a federal statute.5 The 
Congressional Research Service continues to maintain today that 
annotated Constitution and catalog of cases that have struck 
down laws.6 
While the scholarship of the early twentieth century 
seemingly settled some issues about the origins and history of 
judicial review, recent years have seen a renewed burst of 
scholarly energy focused on the history of judicial interpretation 
and enforcement of constitutional texts. We have gained new 
insights into the English and colonial antecedents to American 
judicial review,7 the activities of the courts in the early republic,8 
the rise of judicial review in the states,9 and even the constitutional 
decision-making of the U.S. Supreme Court.10 We have likewise 
 
 4. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (2d ed. 
1921). 
 5. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 82-170, at 1241–54 (1952). 
 6. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, 
https://constitution.congress.gov/. 
 7. See, e.g., MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION (2004); 
PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008). 
 8. See, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER (2011); 
William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005).  
 9. See, e.g., JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS (2012). 
 10. See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF 
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gained better appreciation of the political and social contexts that 
shape the exercise of judicial review and the development of 
constitutional law.11 
Repugnant Laws aims to tell us more about both how the U.S 
Supreme Court has exercised the power of judicial review and 
how politics has shaped the course of the development of 
American constitutional law. For better or for worse, the book 
does take a truncated view of how the Court has sought to enforce 
constitutional requirements on elected officials. It excludes the 
work the Court has done in monitoring state legislatures, which 
has historically been an important and controversial part of how 
the Court has exercised the power of judicial review. It likewise 
excludes how the Court has enforced constitutional limits on the 
discretion of lower court judges and of executive officers. As a 
result, it does not provide anything like a comprehensive overview 
of how the Court has construed the Constitution and sought to 
preserve its commitments. Hopefully the tighter focus on how the 
Court has addressed itself to Congress allows us to see greater 
detail in what the Court has done in this particular area of activity 
and to gain greater insight into the political relationship between 
the Court, national partisan coalitions, and a powerful coordinate 
branch of the federal government. 
Although the book untangles the politics surrounding 
various particular constitutional disputes and periods in time, 
there are three broad issues of special concern. First, the book 
reveals two centuries of judicial review that have largely been left 
in obscurity. Second, it details the relationship between the Court 
and national political coalitions and the extent to which the 
justices have acted as allies of national political leaders. Third, it 
lays the foundation for further thinking about the normative 
difficulties surrounding the practice of judicial review. 
 
RECONSTRUCTION (2011); LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND 
RACIAL MINORITIES (2017); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 
(2004). 
 11. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009); THOMAS M. 
KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY (2004); KEN I. KERSCH, 
CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES (2004); KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING 
ROOSEVELT ON RACE (2004); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008 (2009). 
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THE LOST HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Everybody knows that the American courts exercise the 
power to evaluate the constitutionality of legislation and declare 
those laws that violate the Constitution to be legally void and of 
no effect. To a surprising degree, it has been unclear how the 
courts have exercised that power. 
The problem started at the beginning. The U.S. Constitution 
is clear about such basic governance issues as whether the 
president has the power to veto bills, whether Congress can 
override that veto, and how bills become law. The Constitution 
famously does not say that the federal courts have the power of 
judicial review; it merely says that the “judicial Power of the 
United States” shall be vested in the Supreme Court and any 
inferior courts that Congress might create. It is a myth that Chief 
Justice John Marshall invented, created, or established the power 
of judicial review in his 1803 opinion in the case of Marbury v. 
Madison. Such a power was widely recognized in the years after 
the American Revolution and had been exercised by numerous 
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, prior to 1803. But 
Marshall did provide a compelling account of that power, and his 
opinion eventually became a touchstone for those seeking to 
explain, justify, or criticize such a power.12 
Since the Constitution did not specify that there was such a 
power of judicial review, it also did not specify the form by which 
it should be exercised. The Constitution specified that 
presidential vetoes should be recorded in the journal of each 
legislative chamber. The number of vetoes could be numbered 
and counted. There is no such requirement when the courts strike 
down a law as unconstitutional. When, in 1792, the second 
Congress first heard the news from a constituent that a federal 
judge had declared a federal statutory provision unconstitutional, 
there was a brief debate over what kind of response might be 
appropriate and whether a system needed to be put in place so 
that the legislature would be promptly informed when such 
 
 12. On Marbury’s relative importance, see ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. 
MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989); Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the 
“Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2001); Mark A. Graber, 
Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 609 
(2003); Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review before John Marshall, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 51 (2003); Keith E. Whittington & Amanda Rinderle, Making a Mountain Out of a 
Molehill? Marbury and the Construction of the Constitutional Canon, 39 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 823 (2012). 
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actions were taken.13 But nothing was done. The courts made 
decisions and issued opinions, but no one designated instances of 
judicial review, reported such events to Congress, or put them 
down in an official record. 
After the constitutional centennial, the Supreme Court’s 
reporter, Bancroft Davis, took it upon himself to compile a list of 
cases in which the Court had struck down an Act of Congress as 
unconstitutional, and included it in a historical appendix to a 
volume of the Court’s opinions in 1889.14 The Davis list proved to 
be controversial, and the historical debate over the incidence of 
judicial review was politicized. Populists and Progressives argued 
that the Court had rarely exercised the power of judicial review—
and thus should rarely exercise it in the future, since it was of 
dubious legitimacy. Conservatives argued that the Court had 
exercised the power of judicial review more often—and should 
keep on exercising it in the future, to temper the passions of 
popular majorities. Some argued that John Marshall created the 
power of judicial review out of whole cloth and that the Court 
rarely dared exercise the power afterwards. Some went further 
and denied that even Marbury itself could properly be understood 
as an example of judicial invalidation of a federal law. Others 
argued that Marbury was just one of many instances of judicial 
review and was just one example of a venerable judicial practice.15 
The list that Edward Corwin put together for Congress in the 
mid-twentieth century largely put an end to such debates. It gave 
Congress a comprehensive catalog of the instances in which the 
Court had struck down federal legislation in whole or in part, and 
it provided scholars with a canonical statement of the incidence of 
judicial review. It reflects our baseline understanding of the 
history of judicial review, further refracted through lists of 
canonical cases that seem particularly important for politics, law, 
or teaching.16 
The Corwin list is inadequate. The contours of judicial review 
 
 13. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 556–57 (1792). 
 14. 131 U.S ccxxxv–cclxiii (1889). 
 15. See, e.g., William Marshall Bullitt, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional 
Legislation, 10 A.B.A.J. 419 (1924); Jackson H. Ralston, Judicial Control over Legislatures 
as to Constitutional Questions, 54 AM. L. REV. 1 (1920). 
 16. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998); Tom Donnelly, The Popular Constitutional Canon, 27 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 911 (2019); William M. Wiecek, Is There a Canon of Constitutional 
History?, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 411 (2000). 
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as it has been practiced are not clearly identified with bright lines. 
Corwin made implicit choices about what exactly he was going to 
count as an instance of judicial review for this purpose. Corwin’s 
own list went through permutations, as he added and deleted 
cases until he settled on exactly what he wanted his list of cases to 
convey. He might also have made some mistakes. There is good 
reason to believe that his list is underinclusive of the total number 
of instances in which the Court has refused to apply a federal 
statutory provision because it transcended the boundaries of 
Congress’s constitutional authority. Mark Graber, in particular, 
has contended that Corwin underestimated the extent of judicial 
review in the early republic.17 More obviously, Corwin (and his 
predecessors) made no effort to identify all the cases in which the 
Court had upheld a statutory provision against constitutional 
challenge. We are left with a very one-sided impression of how 
the Court has used its power to review the constitutionality of 
federal legislation. 
The backbone of Repugnant Laws is a new, hopefully 
comprehensive, catalog of all the cases in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court substantively reviewed the constitutionality of an 
application of a provision of a federal statute, whether the result 
was to uphold the statute against constitutional challenge or to 
refuse to apply it due to some constitutional deficiency. That 
dataset is now publicly available, along with a detailed 
explanation of how it was assembled and how variables were 
coded.18 The book and the dataset detail over 1,300 cases in which 
the Court exercised the power of judicial review over Congress. 
Hopefully, it will provide scholars with a resource for more fully 
exploring the intricacies of how the Court has understood the 
scope of congressional power under the Constitution and how it 
has implemented that understanding over time. 
Repugnant Laws seeks to put those cases in context and 
unpack their significance, but it demonstrates that we have 
underestimated the scope and extent of how the Court has 
supervised Congress across its history. When resolving 
constitutional challenges to congressional legislative authority, 
 
 17. Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional 
Development, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73 (2000); Mark A. Graber, New Fiction: Dred Scott and 
the Language of Judicial Authority, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177 (2007). 
 18. Judicial Review of Congress Database (https://scholar.princeton.edu/kewhitt
/judicial-review-congress-database). 
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the Court has far more often upheld what Congress has done than 
reined it in. In hundreds of cases, the Court has worked to expand 
the scope of congressional authority and has endorsed 
controversial exertions of federal legislative power. It has far less 
often rejected components of federal law as being beyond the 
reach of Congress. Even so, the Court has been far more active in 
patrolling the boundaries of congressional power than our 
standard list of judicial invalidations would suggest. All across 
American history, including the first decades of the nation’s 
existence, the Court has been willing to protect litigants from an 
overreaching Congress. Some of those cases have been lost to 
history because, unlike Marbury, they are obscure and politically 
relatively inconsequential. Others have been overlooked because 
the form with which the Court acted does not always match our 
expectations from cases like Marbury. We gain a skewed 
perspective on how the Court has actually exercised the power of 
judicial review by remembering the most salient instances of the 
justices striking laws down. Most of the constitutional work that 
the justices have done does not look like that, but it is that more 
routine marshalling of the judicial power to interpret and enforce 
constitutional provisions that has helped build the modern 
practice of judicial review. 
THE COURT IN THE POLITICAL REGIME 
A second interest of the book is in a set of empirical theories 
about how courts exercise the power of judicial review. One set 
focuses on the relationship of judges to their political 
environment and the implications for the incidence of judicial 
review and the substance of constitutional law. Another set 
focuses on the political sustainability of judicial independence, 
with judicial review being both an important by-product of 
judicial independence and a sign of judicial independence. 
The book is in part a contribution to what is sometimes 
characterized as a political regimes school of judicial politics. As 
Tom Keck has characterized it, this body of literature has 
generally “traced the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to the 
policy and political commitments of governing partisan 
regimes.”19 Rather than thinking about judges as oppositional 
 
 19. Thomas M. Keck, Part Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics 
Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 511 (2007). 
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figures to the forces of democratic politics, this literature situates 
judges within the broader political system where they are more 
likely to work as partners or allies to a governing partisan 
coalition. 
The roots of this literature extend back to the foundational 
work of Robert Dahl and Robert McCloskey in the mid-twentieth 
century. Dahl was primarily a student of American political 
behavior and was generally skeptical of the importance of 
political institutions or constitutional forms in shaping political 
outcomes or preserving a free society. His signal contribution to 
judicial politics was to emphasize the role of the Supreme Court 
as a partner to majority coalitions. As political appointees, the 
justices could be expected to share the values and outlook of the 
governing elites who shaped government policy in the legislative 
and executive branches. In his examination of the history of 
judicial invalidations of federal laws, Dahl concluded that the 
Court had mostly been a passive bystander to federal 
policymaking, with the New Deal experience of an activist Court 
during Franklin Roosevelt’s first term of office being notable for 
its exceptional, rather than its representative, nature.20 
McCloskey was primarily a student of American political thought 
and was more immersed in the constitutional jurisprudence of the 
Court. Where Dahl was inclined to reduce the Court’s work to the 
decision of whether to veto a policy adopted by a legislative 
majority and to treat judges as just another set of policymakers 
within a complex political system, McCloskey did not want to lose 
sight of the extent to which the Court was not only “a willing, 
policy-making, political body,” but also ultimately “a court.”21 
Both tended to agree, however, that the Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence was shaped by and circumscribed by political forces 
off the Court. 
A more recent literature, which has built on those 
foundations, has found that the judiciary’s role within the political 
system is more complicated than the one imagined by Dahl and 
McCloskey. Being an effective ally with a governing coalition 
does not eliminate the possibility of independent and creative 
judicial activity. Where Dahl expected to see a passive Court 
deferring to the policy decisions made elsewhere, more recent 
 
 20. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
 21. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 19, 21 (1960). 
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scholars have found that judges have often been empowered by 
their political circumstances. Elected officials and political leaders 
have found positive uses for the courts, and majority coalitions 
have often found themselves less organized, less harmonious, and 
less confident than a simplified model of majoritarian legislative 
lawmaking might suggest. There have been reasons for courts to 
be full partners in national governance and not just passive 
observers.22 
Much of this recent work exploring regime politics has, 
unlike Dahl, advanced through close observation of a small set of 
case studies. Repugnant Laws attempts to return to Dahl’s own 
favored ground, the full history of Supreme Court review of 
federal legislation, to reconsider how the practice of judicial 
review has fit within the ambitions and needs of electoral and 
lawmaking coalitions. To what degree was Dahl right that the 
overall pattern of judicial behavior is best characterized as one of 
passivity? To the extent that the Court has been more aggressive 
in actively deploying its power to nullify policies, has it done so 
primarily from the posture of a transitional partisan opposition to 
a newly ascendant political coalition? Although the Dahlian 
perspective is useful in helping us think about how the politics of 
judicial review has worked, it is misleading in guiding us toward 
the specific expectation that an allied Court will have little to do. 
The Court has been a meaningful player in American politics, 
using the power of judicial review to advance a constitutional 
vision that coheres with the interests and ideals of elected political 
leaders, but doing so in ways that require limiting as well as 
extending congressional authority. 
A related but distinct empirical literature has been concerned 
with how courts achieve and maintain some form of independence 
from other political actors. Rather than taking judicial 
independence as being achieved through the formal creation of a 
 
 22. For examples of the regime politics literature, see Cornell W. Clayton & J. 
Mitchell Pickerill, The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. 
POL. 233 (2004); Howard Gillman, Courts and the Politics of Partisan Coalitions, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 644 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel 
Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira, eds., 2008); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian 
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Mark 
A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12 STUD. 
AM. POL. DEV. 229 (1998); Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the 
Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321 (2007); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2009).  
35.1 WHITTINGTON  6/19/2020  11:48 AM 
10 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 35:1 
 
judicial system with appropriate characteristics, such as a secure 
tenure of office for individual judges, this literature takes effective 
judicial independence as an empirical puzzle. How can a 
politically weak institution like a judiciary exercise any real 
power, and how can an independent-minded judiciary preserve 
itself in the face of hostile political forces? Dahl’s implicit answer 
is that it would not. Routine vacancies on a politically appointed 
Court would insure that judges will remain within the orbit of 
elected officials and not be inclined to act independently. 
A more recent literature is more optimistic about the 
possibility of a politically sustainable independent judiciary. A 
politically dependent, independent judiciary can operate with 
some degree of influence and autonomy, but only within bounds 
and in limited circumstances. Judicial independence is something 
that has to be achieved within the confines of an ongoing political 
system, and it is not something that simply can be bequeathed or 
inherited. An independent judiciary ultimately needs allies who 
have their own reasons for supporting semi-autonomous courts, 
and the political influence to help protect the courts when they 
are at risk of being subverted. Much of that literature has 
developed in thinking about courts outside the United States, but 
the core insight that judiciaries are only powerful to the extent 
that other powerful political actors have reasons to tolerate 
judicial activity is as applicable to the American context as to any 
other.23 
Hovering over the history of judicial review is how the 
United States Supreme Court has managed to build up the 
practice of judicial review and sustain some measure of 
independence and influence over time. As Court-packing is once 
again in the air, it is perhaps more obvious now than it might once 
have been that judicial independence is an ongoing political 
project, and that the exercise of judicial review can only occur 
 
 23. For examples of the political judicial independence literature, see Frank Cross, 
Judicial Independence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 557 (Keith E. 
Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira, eds., 2008); John Ferejohn, 
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 353 (1999); William M. Landis & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in 
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); J. Mark Ramseyer, The 
Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 
(1994); Georg Vanberg, Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 99 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel 
Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira, eds., 2008). 
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within bounds of political tolerance. Placing the Court within the 
framework of American political development requires assessing 
the sources of political support for the Court and significance of 
the Court’s own actions for the larger flow of political events. 
In showing how the Court has exercised judicial review over 
time and placing the Court’s work in political context, we can also 
begin to see how the Court has been able to sustain political 
support for that practice. Although the Court has been quite 
active in invalidating statutes across its history, it has rarely made 
frontal assaults on core commitments of united political 
majorities. The Court has generally stayed within the political 
mainstream. In doing so, it has made adjustments on the margins 
of public policy and exploited fissures in governing coalitions. But 
when the Court has strayed too far into the political thicket and 
found itself isolated from powerful allies, it has shown itself to be 
vulnerable. The Court is allowed to gore some oxen, but it may 
not strike down any sacred cows. 
REVISITING THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN 
DIFFICULTY 
Finally, the history of judicial review provides more material 
for thinking about the normative issues associated with judicial 
review. Repugnant Laws is a work of political history, not 
normative theory. But our normative theorizing about judicial 
review should be informed by how the practice actually works, 
which includes an appreciation of how the Court has realistically 
exercised the power of judicial review and how the Court’s actions 
have fit within a political context. It makes little sense to develop 
normative theories regarding an idealized practice that is wholly 
divorced from the historical reality or that proceeds on the basis 
of assumptions that have little grounding in lived experience. 
The hoary framing of the countermajoritarian problem 
rested on a set of empirical assumptions about the workings of 
American politics, as well as a set of normative values about how 
political action could be justified. It has the advantage of being 
intuitive and fitting an established narrative about judicial review. 
When invalidating a statute, a court does no doubt strike down a 
policy endorsed by a legislative majority, and such majorities are 
themselves put in place through electoral victories. The Populists, 
Progressives, and New Dealers all told themselves a story about 
intransigent courts overturning the will of the people. 
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There might be a kernel of truth in such narratives, and they 
might account for some examples of judicial review, but this does 
not seem like an adequate starting point for thinking about the 
phenomenon of judicial review more generally. The political 
regimes literature is sometimes read to suggest that, far from 
being an antidemocratic institution, the Court is simply a 
majoritarian one. That would seem to take things too far. The 
Court might be tethered to elected political coalitions, but the 
justices do not simply implement majoritarian policy preferences. 
The Court is a political institution within a democratic political 
system, but it is neither an immoveable barrier to the majority will 
nor a simple instrument of electoral politics. 
There are normative issues surrounding the practice of 
judicial review, both as to how judges ought to exercise such a 
power and how a power to set aside policies adopted by 
democratically accountable assemblies can be justified. The actual 
practice of judicial review shows the justices regularly rendering 
politically controversial decisions that can find support in the 
political movements that brought those justices to the bench. But 
if the justices sometimes look distinctly Republican or Democrat, 
conservative or liberal, they also routinely issue decisions that 
cannot be reduced to partisan or ideological shibboleths. The 
history of judicial review is a story of neither a democratic nor an 
antidemocratic court, and compelling normative theorizing will 
have to take into account the often complex and messy 
relationship between the courts and the politicians. 
 
